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I. Introduction
The history of pesticide regulation has been nothing short of a roller coaster ride. Just when it seemed as if all
the glitches had been worked out, a new inconsistency or complexity arose. Given the prevalence and hence
importance of pesticide usage in the United States, there has been no shortage of interested parties, poking
and prodding at every new legislative provision or agency rule. The result has been a no-stone-unturned
attitude towards pesticide regulation. This has led to a signicant slowdown in the governmental machinery
responsible for protecting us on the one hand, and for not sabotaging an otherwise adequate and reasonably
priced food supply on the other hand. This daunting task is arguably too great for any one agency. Hence,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have joined
forced to meet the task at hand. Therein lies the problem, however. Coordination between the agencies
has been elusive at best. Plowing through a eld of inconsistency and ambiguity, the dual-agency attack
has provided us with a story worth telling. Section II of this paper provides the reader with a brief history
4of pesticide regulation as it existed before the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA). A substantial
discussion is included on the Delaney Clause, the thorn of all thorns in the agencies' sides for many years.
Section III discusses the major provisions of the FQPA, as applied to pesticide regulation. Section IV is
devoted to a comprehensive discussion of the winding road that followed the Act. In particular, the problems
created by the FQPA, most notably a jurisdictional nightmare that would take two years to sort out utilizing
the combined eorts of the FDA and EPA. Even then, jurisdictional issues remain unresolved as \xes" are
still in the works.
II. Pesticide Regulation Before the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
A. A Brief History of Pesticide Regulation
Although pesticide regulation dates back to The Federal Insecticide Act of 1910, regulation was narrowly fo-
cused on labeling requirements until 1972.1 By amending the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) of 1947,2 Congress created a registration requirement for all pesticides to be enforced by the
newly created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).3 Thus, under FIFRA, a pesticide must be registered
before it can be sold or distributed. In reviewing a registration application, the statute directs the EPA to
engage in what amounts to a risk-benet analysis by weighing \the economic, social, and environmental
1See Marina M. Lolley, Carcinogen Roulette: The Game Played Under FIFRA, 49 Md. L. Rev. 975, 977 (1990).
2Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80104, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codied at 7 U.S.C. xx 136
et seq. (Supp. 1997)).
3See Scott Douglas Bauer, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Replacing Old Impracticalities with New Uncertainties
in Pesticide Regulation, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1369, 1372 (1997).
5costs and benets" of the pesticide's use.4
The other major piece of legislation on point is the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) of
1938. Pesticide regulation was brought under its umbrella with the passage of the Miller Pesticide Amend-
ment of 1954, now section 408 of the FD&C Act.5 Pursuant to section 408, the EPA must set tolerances,
or maximum allowable levels, for pesticide residues on raw agricultural commodities.6 If these tolerances
are exceeded, the residue-containing food will be considered \adulterated" and, hence, prohibited by the
Act.7 In keeping with the spirit of FIFRA, this section also embraces a riskbenet approach by instructing
the Administrator to consider, when setting tolerances, \the necessity for the production of an adequate,
wholesome, and economical food supply".8
However, the philosophy of regulating pesticides under the rubric of a risk-benet inquiry would soon be
undermined with the passage of the Food Additive Amendment of 1958,9 now section 409 of the FD&C Act.
In particular, the FD&C Act dened pesticide residues in processed food as food additives where \they are
either concentrated during food processing or are not reduced to the extent of good manufacturing practice
during such processing."10 The erosion of the traditional risk-benet approach was provided courtesy of the
now infamous Delaney Clause, contained in the 1958 Amendment. In particular, the Delaney Clause sets a
zero-level tolerance for all carcinogenic additives.11 Thus, if a pesticide was considered to be a food additive
47 U.S.C. x 136(bb), amended by Food Quality Protection Act x 230(a).
5Pesticide Chemical Act, Pub. L. No. 83518, 68 Stat. 511 (1954).
6See Peter Hutt & Richard Merrill, Food and Drug Law 306-07 (2d ed. 1991).
7See 21 U.S.C. x 342(a), amended by Food Quality Protection Act x 404.
821 U.S.C. x 346a(b) (2) (B) (iii) (II), amended by Food Quality Protection Act x 405.
9Pub. L. No. 85929, 72 Stat. 1785 (1958)
10James Smart, All the Stars in the Heavens were in the Right Places: The Passage of the Food Quality Protection Act of
1996, 17 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 273, 279 (1998); FD&C Act x 402(a)(2)(C), 21 U.S.C. x 342(a)(2)(C) (1994).
11See FD&C Act x 409(c)(3)(A), 21 U.S.C. x 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). See also Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the Delaney clause has been interpreted as \an absolute bar to all carcinogenic food additives").
6under the denition given above, and it exhibited carcinogenic properties, then it would be banned without
the benet of a risk-benet examination.
Therefore, pesticide regulation turned on the question of whether or not the pesticide could be considered a
food additive under section 409. The answer to this question lied in the fact that section 409 applied only to
certain processed foods. In particular, it applied only when the pesticides concentrated in the food during
processing, as well as to those whose residues had not been adequately removed.12 Further, raw agricultural
products were always exempt from the section 409, and hence the Delaney Clause, since pesticide residues
on unprocessed foods automatically failed the \food additive" denition.
Adoption of the Delaney Clause and EPA's subsequent interpretations created what has been dubbed the
\Delaney Paradox".13 In the rst instance, pesticides that were used in unprocessed foods or which did not
concentrate during processing would avoid Delaney, requiring only a section 408 tolerance.14 Further, for
these types of pesticides, tolerance levels were based on a risk-benet analysis. Alternatively, a pesticide
used on foods to be processed that did not concentrate during processing, required both section 408 and
section 409 tolerances.15 Moreover, a concentrating non-carcinogenic pesticide would be dealt with under
the riskbenet rubric discussed above. However, if the same pesticide were carcinogenic, the Delaney Clause
would prohibit the EPA from setting a tolerance level for it, regardless of the level of risks or benets.16
12See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
13See Dominic P. Madigan, Setting an Anti-Cancer Policy: Risk, Politics, and the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17
Va. Envtl. L.J. 187, 196 (1998) (describing the inconsistency which has come to be known as the \Delaney Paradox").
14See Bauer, supra note 3, at 1377.
15See id.
16See id.
7B. The Expansion of Delaney
Whether by accident or not, two EPA policies would serve to dramatically expand the reach of the Delaney
Clause, and with it a swirl of controversy. Adoption of the rst policy, dubbed the \coordination" policy,
was purported to be part of an eort to limit the eects of the \Delaney Paradox" discussed above.17 In
particular, interpreting the statute strictly, a carcinogenic pesticide could be registered under FIFRA and
receive a tolerance level under section 408 if a risk-benet analysis supported it. However, the same pesticide
would be barred from receiving a tolerance level under section 409 if it could ultimately be used on processed
foods. To avoid this dichotomous treatment, the EPA essentially read the Delaney Clause into section 408
by adopting a coordination policy. Under this policy tolerances would not be assigned for pesticides that
were to be used on raw products if the same pesticide would fail to qualify for a tolerance under section 409
if used on processed foods.18 EPA rationalized this policy by asserting that, without it, the marketplace
would suer since farmers would be unable to know ahead of time if in fact their crops would be processed.19
The second policy which served to expand rather than contract the eects of Delaney was EPA's \concen-
tration in fact" policy. Here the idea was that a pesticide residue would be regulated under section 409
(and hence Delaney if it were oncogenic) if the pesticide concentrated at all, regardless of the degree of
concentration.20 The alternative policy, which would have limited Delaney's reach, would have been one
where a pesticide would be deemed a \concentrating pesticide" only where it concentrated to a point above
its tolerance level. By rejecting this approach in favor of a \concentration in fact" approach, the EPA seemed
17See Smart, supra note 10, at 282-83.
18See The Pesticide Coordination Policy: Response to Petitions, 61 Fed. Reg. 2378, 2379 (1996).
19See Section 409 Tolerances; Response to Petition Requesting Revocation of Food Additive Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg.
17,560, 17,562 (1990).
20See Madigan, supra note 13, at 197-98.
8to be undermining its self-professed eorts to restrict the negative impact of the Delaney Clause.
Whether there was in fact an eort to limit Delaney's reach or not, two things seem obvious in retrospect.
First, these ruling dramatically expanded the reach of the Delaney Clause. In the case of the \coordination
policy", unprocessed foods were to be subjected to the same scrutiny as that of processed commodities. In
the case of the \concentration" policy, the EPA adopted the most expansive denition it possible could. And
second, the traditional risk-benet spirit of pesticide regulation was slowly being whittled away.
C. Getting around Delaney
Following the passage of the Delaney Clause and EPA's subsequent policy adoptions, EPA found itself facing
intense criticism. For example, the clause made it dicult to replace older, more dangerous pesticides.21
Such pesticides had tolerances based on outdated, less sensitive tests. New and potentially safer pesticides,
on the other hand, faced state-of-the-art testing procedures which made them more likely to fail Delaney.22
Thus, it was argued that, in its present state, the Delaney Clause was actually increasing risk due to pesticide
residues.
EPA received yet another blow with a 1987 National Research Council (\NRC") report asserting that the
21See Board on Agriculture, Nat'l Research Council, Regulating Pesticides in Food: The Delaney Paradox 41 (1987) (here-
inafter NRC Report).
22Instead of being able to detect residues up to the parts per million level, as was the case when the Clause was initially
passed, modern technology was making it possible to detect carcinogenic pesticide residues up to the parts per trillion level.
9Delaney Clause was not the most eective way of reducing cancer risk. The report estimated that up to 90%
of diet-based cancer risk was the result of \uses sanctioned by tolerances granted before" the more rigorous
testing requirements adopted in 1978.23 Further, the report found that approximately one half of the cancer
risks posed by pesticides were from foods unprocessed foods, which, due to their raw form, were beyond the
scope of the Delaney Clause.24 The report recommended that \[a] negligible risk standard for carcinogens in
food, applied consistently to all pesticides and to all forms of food, could dramatically reduce total dietary
exposure to oncogenic pesticides with modest reduction of benets."25
The NRC report placed the irrationality of the Delaney Clause squarely before the EPA. By highlight-
ing the ineectiveness of the Clause, the report made public that which EPA had been struggling with for
some time. Mainly, the fact that Delaney was, at best, ineective in the pesticide context, or more likely, a
counterproductive rule.26 Immediately after the report was published, the EPA began to engage in what can
only be described as an anti-Delaney campaign. Although there was evidence before the report suggesting
that the EPA was resistant to applying the Delaney Clause,27 it was not a position taken publicly until the
announcement of its \de minimis" exception to Delaney in October 1988.28 The \de minimis" policy was
essentially a \gutting" of the Delaney Clause. Under the exception, the EPA would apply a negligible risk
standard set at one-in-one-million lifetime risk.29 Any pesticide which presented less than a negligible risk
of cancer would be approved under section 409.30
What is so interesting about the adoption of the \de minimis" exception to Delaney was the overwhelm-
23Id. at 11
24See Smart, supra note 10, at 290 (stating the Committee's ndings and recommendations).
25Id. at 290 (quoting NRC Report, supra note 21, at 12).
26See generally id. (discussing the NRC Report's ndings which point to the ineectiveness of the Delaney Clause).
27See id. at 283-86 (stating that the EPA, in following the FDA's lead, avoided application of the Delaney Clause by adopting
FDA policies which limited the applicability of Delaney).
28See Regulation of Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney Paradox Policy Statement, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,104 (1988).
29See id. at 41,104.
30See id at 41,112.
10ing sentiment that the policy was against the law. Some have tried to explain EPA's seemingly irrational
behavior by suggesting that it was the only way to get the other branches of government involved.31 By
inviting a challenge to the new rule, EPA would force the courts to strike it down, which would ultimately
force Congress to respond. Although it is possible that this may have been the case, it is unclear to this
author why the EPA could not have achieved the same result by simply applying the Delaney Clause in its
rigid form. Presumably an equally dramatic eect could have been achieved with an EPA proposal to ban
all carcinogenic pesticides. Surely this would have evoked a Congressional response.
Commentators have also suggested that the rule appears to be nothing more than a pretense particularly in
light of the fact that the issue had been all but decided in the DC Circuit, in Public Citizen v. Young.32 In
that case, the court held that the FDA incarnation of the de minimis exception to Delaney for color additives
violated the statute.33 However, careful reading of the opinion shows that the court deliberately limited its
holding to the color additives provision.34 The court went on to state in a footnote that \the operation of
the food additive Delaney Clause raises complex issues...."35 Thus, in light of the courts careful exclusion of
the food additives issue, it may have been the case that the reverse was actually true. Namely, that it was
the DC Circuit inviting the EPA to promulgate an exception to Delaney, not the EPA \baiting" the courts
into striking down such an exception.
31See Smart at 294 (stating that the policy's clear conict with the Delaney Clause \suggests that the agency strategically
released the de minimis policy statement in order to eect a change in the law through a showdown with the other branches of
government").
32See id. (stating that this \almost certainly dictated a similar ruling on a challenge to the de minimis application to section
409).
33See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, at 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
34See id. at 1120 (stating that although the provisions for color additives and food additives are almost identically worded,
their context is clearly dierent).
35Id. at 1118 n.13.
11D. Revenge of Delaney
If in fact the DC Circuit had sent the EPA a message in 1987 with its Public Citizen v. Young decision, it
fell on deaf ears in 1992 in the Ninth Circuit. In Les v. Reilly,36 the Ninth Circuit overturned the EPA's
de minimis policy holding that both the language of the statute and the legislative history indicate that
Congress intended that it be applied in rigid fashion.37 The court further noted that it was not for the EPA
or the courts to decide on the wisdom of the Delaney Clause.38
The apparent inconsistency between the DC Circuit holdings and the Ninth Circuit's may stem from two
important factors. First, and most obvious, is the fact that we have dierent courts deciding cases at dierent
times. Second, there had been a noticeable change in public sentiment in the interim. In particular, there
seemed to have been a growing concern with the safety of children. This shift appears to coincide with the
1989 study from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) focusing on the cancer risks to children by
pesticide residue.39 In particular, the pesticide known as Alar became almost a household name thanks to
the NRDC's eective use of the media. Despite eorts by both the EPA and FDA, public reaction to the
scare forced the EPA to ban Alar.40
36Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992).
37See id. at 98889
38See id. at 990.
39See generally Natural Resources Defense Council, Intolerable Risk: Pesticides in Our Children's Food (1989).
40See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 6, at 318.
12E. The Time Was Right
With EPA's de minimis policy overturned and public sentiment shifting, the pressure was squarely on the
shoulders of Congress. In what appeared to have been an eort to turn the heat up even more for Congress,
the EPA quickly announced that it would have to \revoke tolerances for numerous widely used pesticides".41
Although eorts to amend the much-maligned Delaney Clause were being made as far back as the 100th
Congress in 1987,42 it would not be until 1991 that Representatives Terry Bruce (DIL) and Thomas Bliley
(RVA) would introduce H.R. 3216 |the bill which would eventually be passed as the Food Quality Protection
Act (FQPA) of 1996. However, it would take key judicial decisions like Les v. Reilly and numerous debates
over several subsequently introduced bills before Congress would be able to make headway on the issue.43
In addition, the EPA had begun to react to the Les decision and environmentalists' pleas by revoking 23
dierent pesticide tolerances between 1993 and 1996.44 Given the potential nancial impact such revocations
could have, it was no surprise that these revocations were met with intense criticism and legal challenge from
industry.45 This fact was not lost on the House Commerce Committee during the FQPA hearings. It found
that such disruption \could have serious dietary and cost consequences for consumers and serious adverse
impacts on the economies of the nation's major agricultural States."46
41Bauer, supra note 3, at 1382.
42See Smart, supra note 10, at 290-92 (describing how three newly introduced bills contained language aimed at eliminating
the disparity created by the Delaney Clause).
43See generally id. at 318-28 (asserting that many factors contributed to the passage of the FQPA in 1996 including Republican
eorts to improve their environmental record, judicial establishment of a schedule to revoke old pesticide tolerances, industry
rhetoric, and changing public opinion about the eectiveness of the Delaney Clause).
44See Madigan, supra note 13, at 217.
45See Section 409 Tolerance Revocation Proposals Criticized, Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News, Vol. 23, No. 34 (June 21,
1995) (describing several criticisms and challenges levied by industry against EPA section 409 tolerance revocation proposals).
46Madigan at 218 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104669, pt. 2, at 32 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1268, 1271).
13Amidst intense pressure from all angles |industry, environmentalists, and even the EPA itself| the House
passed the bill on July 23 with a vote of 417 to 0. The next day, the Senate approved it by voice vote with
no debate.47 Considering the intense debates that had preceded it, the passage of the FQPA was actually
sudden and almost anti-climatic.
III. Second Generation Pesticide Regulation:
The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996.
A. Setting a Single Standard for Pesticide Tolerances
In place of the now-defunct zero-level tolerance for carcinogenic pesticides, the FQPA establishes a single
safety standard for pesticide residues for all foods. This is accomplished by redening the terms \food
additive" and \pesticide chemical residue" such that all food borne pesticide residues are covered by section
408 of the FD & C Act.48 This was then followed by the amendment of section 408's safety standard to one
of \reasonable certainty" such that \no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical
residue."49 This standard is applied in a quasi-risk-benet fashion. It falls short of a true risk-benet
approach in the sense that it severely limits the circumstances under which a pesticides benet may be
47See Bauer, supra note 3, at 1385-86.
48See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 x 402(a), 21 U.S.C.A. x 321(q)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
49Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 x 405(b)(2)(A)(ii), 21 U.S.C.A. x 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1996).
14considered. The FQPA allows the EPA to consider benets, but to a much less extent than it previously did
under its now overruled de minimis exception. Under the EPA's de minimis policy the \EPA's tolerance-
setting practice for carcinogenic residues was to create a range of risk between 1/1,000,000 and 1/10,000 in
which the EPA would consider a pesticide's benets."50 Under the FQPA, the EPA must rst determine
what level of exposure is \safe". Once that is done, the EPA may adjust a pesticide's tolerance level to
account for its benets, but only to the point that the pesticides residue poses no more than \two times
the safe exposure level over a lifetime of exposure."51 Indications are the EPA will dene \safe" as any
risk greater than 1/1,000,000 lifetime risk.52 That being the case, the EPA would only be allowed to adjust
tolerances to account for benets when the risks posed are between 1/1,000,000 and 1/500,000 for lifetime
exposure to the risk. Any risk greater than 1/500,00 for lifetime exposure would bar any consideration of
benets.
Nevertheless, the shift away from a Delaney-type approach to the current version of a risk-benet approach
represents a fundamental shift in how we, as a society, view risk. In 1958, the Delaney Clause was written
to reect the fundamental belief that carcinogenic risks could not be adequately managed, but rather should
be eliminated whenever detected. This unbending sentiment, however, has seen its gradual erosion through
episodes like the saccharin incident, for example. Perhaps the phenomena of risk-saturation53 has also played
a part in the emerging public acceptance of informed risk management.
50Bauer at 1398-99.
51Id. at 1399.
52See id.; Section 408(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the FQPA denes \safe" to mean \reasonable certainty that no harm will result from
aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for
which there is reliable information."; \[A] 'reasonable certainty of no harm' is generally interpreted to mean that there be no
more than a [1/1,000,000] chance that the residue would cause cancer." Id. at note 240 (quoting David Hosansky, Pesticide
Bill Highlights, 54 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 2104, 2104 (1996)).
53Risk-saturation is the phenomena that results from a bombardment of information concerning the pervasiveness of daily
carcinogen exposure. The eect of this bombardment is the general acceptance of risk as a way of life and is best exemplied
in the increasing popular slogan of \everything causes cancer".
15B. Other Provision
Stemming from the new found public awareness of children's safety, the FQPA requires the EPA to consider
the special susceptibility of children and infants to pesticides.54 The Act also creates a timeline for the
EPA to follow in reevaluating existing tolerances,55 preempts states from setting their own tolerances,56 and
limits the number of remedies available to the FDA.57
IV. Pesticide Regulation: Post-Delaney
A. Increased demand on EPA resources
The FQPA, although alleviating some of the constraints the EPA felt as a result of the Delaney Clause,
imposes new and dicult responsibilities on the EPA. For example, as mentioned above, the Act requires
the EPA to assess pesticide residue risks to infants and children based on available information. Further,
54See FQPA x 405(b)(2)(C)(i)(II), 21 U.S.C.A. x 346a(b)(2)(C)(i)(II) (West Supp. 1996). EPA must also publish a special
determination of safety for infants and children. See id.
55See id. x 405(q), 21 U.S.C.A. x 346a(q) (West Supp. 1996)
56See id. x 405(n)(4), 21 U.S.C.A. x 346a(n)(4) (West Supp. 1996).
57\The Act limits civil penalties to $50,000 per individual and $250,000 per entity, up to a maximum of $500,000 for all
violations adjudicated in a single proceeding... [and the] FDA must opt either for civil penalties or for criminal penalties, but
cannot pursue both." Allison D. Carpenter, Impact of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 3 Envtl. Law. 479, 490 (1997).;
\Assessment of a civil penalty also prohibits use of the seizure authorities provided in FFDCA x 304, 21 U.S.C. x 334 (1994)
and the injunction authorities of FFDCA x 302, 21 U.S.C. x 332 (1994)." Id. at note 107.
16\[T]he FQPA now requires EPA to consider aggregate exposure (i.e., exposure not
only from dietary sources, but also from other sources such as drinking water and
residential uses of the given pesticide). Also, in establishing tolerances, EPA must
consider the cumulative eects from multiple compounds with a common mech-
anism of toxicity. These provisions are among the most technically challenging
mandates imposed by the FQPA, in large part because of the lack of information
and experience in assessing aggregate exposure and cumulative risk."58
In addition, the FQPA directs the EPA to reassess all existing tolerances within 10 years,59 and must apply
the new safety standard to existing tolerances, in order of priority, to those tolerances that appear to pose
the greatest risk to public health.60 According to EPA estimates, there are more than 9,000 tolerances that
have been established for pesticides.61 Thus, meeting this statutory schedule would require the EPA to
average over 3 tolerance reassessments per working day. This would be a monumental task in itself, however
the task is compounded by the fact that EPA must give priority to those pesticides posing the greatest risks
|pesticides which represent some of the \most widely used and dicult to assess."62 To make matters
worse, more than two years have passed and the Agency has yet to issue a tolerance reassessment for any
existing tolerance under the FQPA.63
B. The Next Thorn Bush: Jurisdiction
59See 21 U.S.C. s346a(q)(1)(c).
60See Weinstein (stating that \the Agency will not have much time to develop its new policies and procedures before having
to tackle some of the toughest issues").
61See Oce of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, U.S. EPA, 1996 Food Quality Protection Act Implementation
Plan 4 (1997).
62Id.
63See id.
171. Historical Account of Jurisdiction for Pesticide Regulation (Pre-FQPA)
Although there is little question that the EPA has jurisdiction over the sale, distribution, and use of \pesti-
cides",64 the issue has been somewhat more muddled when it comes to pesticide residues. The complications
begin with the fact that the EPA has interpreted the terms \pesticide"65 and \pest", as dened in FIFRA,
quite broadly. This has led to the extension of EPA jurisdiction to chemicals \used to control weeds and
fungi on crops, and microorganisms that may be present on permanent or semi-permanent surfaces, such as
counter tops and food processing equipment that may come in contact with food."66 Moreover, the EPA
utilizes the registration provisions of FIFRA to regulate everything from the composition of the pesticide,
to its labeling.67
Since its inception in 1970, the EPA assumed jurisdiction for \pesticide chemicals" as dened under the
FD&C Act. Under the original wording, this meant that the EPA would regulate the residues of FIRFA
pesticides when they appeared \in or on raw agricultural commodities."68 However, the scope of the term
\pesticide chemical" was narrower under the FD&C Act than was the term \pesticide" in FIFRA.69 This
caused EPA's residue jurisdiction to fall short of its pesticide jurisdiction, as dened under FIFRA. By
default, the FDA would assume jurisdiction for pesticide residues that were not in raw agricultural com-
modities, and hence not considered \pesticide chemicals".70 Such residues would instead be treated as \food
64See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. 136 et seq.
65\The term `pesticide' means... any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest...." FIFRA x2(u).
6663 Fed. Reg. 54532 (October 9, 1998).
67See generally FIFRA x12(a).
6863 Fed. Reg. 54532, 54533 (October 9, 1998).
69FD&C Act limited the denition of a \pesticide chemical" by requiring that it be a FIFRA pesticide \which is used in the
production, storage, or transportation of raw agricultural commodities" FD&C Act, x201(q), 21 U.S.C. 321(q) (1994) (amended
1996).
70See 63 Fed. Reg. 54532, 54533 (October 9, 1998).
18additives" and regulated by the FDA accordingly.71 Pragmatically speaking, the only pesticides that fell
into FDA's lap under the food additives guise were pesticides used for antimicrobial purposes. Examples
of such included residues found in disinfectants used on food-contact surfaces, residues on food packaging
material, and slimicides used in the manufacture of paper and paperboard.72
The result of this erroneous distinction between raw agricultural commodities and processed foods is that two
given pesticides, having identical chemical structures, may be subject to dierent safety standards depending
on whether they resided in processed or unprocessed foods.
2. Eects of the FQPA
In an attempt to eliminate the diering treatment for processed and unprocessed foods, the FQPA made
signicant changes to the FD&C Act's language regarding pesticides. These changes, however, raised serious
jurisdictional. In particular, the FQPA eliminates the restriction that a \pesticide chemical" exist only where
the pesticide is used in conjunction with a raw agricultural product.73 Further, the Act modies the term
\food additive" such that it now excludes pesticide residues \on a raw agricultural commodity or processed
food".74 The intended eect of these changes was to give the EPA sole jurisdiction over all pesticide residues
on food, regardless of whether the food was processed or not.75 However, this was not entirely the case as
71The FD&C Act provides an exclusion for \pesticide chemicals" from the denition of \food additive". See x 201(s). Thus,
as soon as a substance falls within the denition of a \pesticide chemical", it is automatically removed from the denition of
\food additive", and hence removed from FDA jurisdiction.
72See id. at 54534.
73See FD&C Act x201(q)(1).
74Id. at x201(s)(1)
75The FQPA creates a single, health-based standard, eliminating \longstanding problems posed by multiple standards for
pesticides in raw and processed foods." USEPA, Oce of Pesticide Programs, Highlights of the Food Quality Protection Act of
1996, (visited Jan. 28, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/opppspsl/fqpa/fqpahigh.htm>.; See also John Dubeck, Antimicrobial Reg-
ulatory Technical Corrections Act Becomes Law; Jurisdictional Chaos Created by FQPA Also Addressed in a Joint FDA/EPA
Policy Statement, (visited Jan. 28, 1999) <http://www.khlaw.com/artca.html> (hereinafter ARTCA Becomes Law).
19will be discussed in the following section |section IV(B)(2)(a)(i). Furthermore, these changes have led to
signicant shifts in the jurisdictional boundaries between the FDA and EPA in the area of antimicrobials.
a. Jurisdictional Implications of the FQPA for Antimicrobials
i. Antimicrobial Substances Directed Against Microbes in or on Edible Food, Animal Drinking Water, and Process Water that Contacts Edible Food:
Both the FDA and EPA claim, and it does not appear, that the FQPA amendments have altered the ju-
risdictional boundaries for this category of antimicrobials. Both pre- and post-FQPA jurisdiction for this
category is shared between the EPA and FDA, with the boundary often being located along the dicult to
draw and often baseless line of processed food/raw agricultural commodity.
The dichotomy between processed and unprocessed foods, although eliminated by the FQPA in the denition
of \pesticide chemical", persists in the denition of the term \pests". Under a long-standing rule, the EPA
excludes all microorganisms in processed foods from the denition of \pests."76 Accordingly, antimicrobial
chemicals used on such organisms are not considered \pesticides" under FIFRA, and hence are not \pesticide
chemicals" under the FD&C Act.77 As mentioned above, if such residues can not be classied as \pesticide
chemicals", they are, by default, FDA regulated \food additives".78 Hence, pesticide residue in or on \pro-
cessed foods" are subject to FDA regulation, while residue on raw agricultural commodities are subject to
EPA jurisdiction. Although this oversight creates no new jurisdictional issues, it continues the historically
inconsistent treatment for antimicrobial pesticides.
The EPA has admitted that a distinction between processed and unprocessed foods is ambiguous at best.79
This is due to the fact that it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether a given activity is \processing"
or simply post-harvest treatment. This distinction is particularly strained when the antimicrobials are used
76See 40 CFR 152.5(d).
77Even after the 1996 amendments, the FD&C Act requires that \pesticide chemicals" be \pesticides" as dened under
FIFRA. See FD&C Act x201(q)(1). See also 63 Fed. Reg. 54532, at 54536.
78See supra note 71 and accompanying test.
79See 63 Fed. Reg. 54532, at 54537.
20inside a food processing facility, where some commodities leave the facility with no processing and others
undergo further processing.80 Accordingly, in an attempt to counter this baseless distinction the EPA has
recently announced its intention to change the denition of \pest".81
ii. Antimicrobial Substances Used to Sanitize or Disinfect Food-Contact Surfaces:82 Prior to the FQPA,
this category of antimicrobials was not regulated as \pesticide chemicals" since they did not satisfy the
requirement that they be \used in the production, storage, or transportation of raw agricultural commodi-
ties."83 Instead, they fell within FDA's jurisdiction as a \food additive". However, with the elimination of
the restrictive language, such antimicrobials satisfy the denition of \pesticide chemical" under the FD&C
Act. Accordingly, jurisdiction over this category has been eectively transferred to the EPA.
iii. Antimicrobial Substances Used in the Production of Food Packaging Materials & Food-Contact Articles:84
As with the preceding category of antimicrobials, jurisdiction over this category is considered to have been
transferred from the FDA to the EPA with the elimination of the language in the FD&C Act requiring
that a pesticide be \used in the production, storage, or transportation of raw agricultural commodities".85
Without this language, such substances are \pesticide chemicals" and hence not \food additives", as they
were previously considered.
Some commentators have suggested, however, that the jurisdictional shift for this category of antimicrobials
is unnecessary under the law and has occurred only as a direct result of the adoption of a narrow denition
80See id.
81See infra Section IV.E.
82\This category includes antimicrobial substances that are used in or on equipment in food production facilities such as farm
bulk tanks and milking machines; in manufacturing facilities such as meat saws/grinders, shellsh skimmers...; in retail food
facilities such as bulk tankers used for liquid eggs or dairy products." 63 Fed. Reg. 54532, at 54538.
83Id.
84\This category of products includes slimicides used in the manufacture of food-contact paper and paperboard, and preser-
vatives added to... adhesives or coatings...[,] and sanitizers applied to food containers such as aseptic packaging." Further
included in this category are \pesticide products such as: preservatives used in... adhesives and coatings intended for use in
food-contact articles, and antimicrobial substances used in the manufacture of conveyor belts, cutting boards, plastic tubing,
and other articles that come in contact with food...." Id. at 54539.
85Id.
21of \food".86 In particular, the EPA has chosen to dene food as that which is edible and intended to be
consumed.87 This denition excludes food-contact items from the denition of \processed food", which in
turn negates the EPA jurisdiction exception for pesticides used for microorganisms in processed foods. If,
however, food-contact items were dened as a type of \food", then they would be considered \processed
food", since they are clearly not raw agricultural commodities. That being the case, pesticide residues
would not be subject to EPA jurisdiction since, as mentioned previously, the working denition of \pesticide
chemical" excludes microorganisms used on processed foods.88
John Dubeck, the apparent originator of the premise outlined above, presented it to EPA and FDA ocials
on February 18, 1997 at a meeting on \Jurisdictional Issues for Antimicrobials Used in Food Applications."89
However, neither agency has accepted Dubeck's interpretation.90
C. Fixing the Fix: Eorts to undo the unintended eects of the FQPA
86See John B. Dubeck, Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Antimicrobials Used in Contact With Processed Food (visited Jan. 28,
1999)<http://www.khlaw.com/archives.fdamicro.htm> (hereinafter Jurisdiction Over Antimicrobials) (outlining the premise
upon which the conclusion is ultimately drawn that no jurisdictional changes resulted from the FQPA).
87See 63 Fed. Reg. 54532, at 54533.
88This broad interpretation of \food" could follow from its equally broad denition in the FD&C Act, namely that \food" is
any article used as food by man or animal, including components of such articles. See FD&C Act x 201(f). Furthermore, such
an interpretation is not without judicial precedent. In Natick Paperboard Corp. V. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 810 (1976), the court found paperboard intended for packaging food without an intervening barrier to
be covered by the denition. Further, in United States v. Technical Egg Products, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ga. 1959) the
court allowed incubator reject eggs intended for non-food use to be seized as food.
89See Jurisdiction Over Antimicrobials, supra note 86.; See also John B. Dubeck, Summary of February 18, 1997
Meeting with EPA and FDA on Jurisdictional Issues for Antimicrobials Used in Food Applications (visited Jan. 28,
1999)<http://www.khlaw.com/articles.htm> (hereinafter Meeting With EPA & FDA).
90From Dubeck's report of the meeting he notes that \it seemed clear that at least some FDA sta were not comfortable
with EPA's interpretation of the Act". Id.
22As early as December 4, 1996, the EPA and the FDA believed that they had the jurisdictional issue under
hand.91 They even were purported to have had an agreement \in principle" on the aected products, and
further claimed to have \found their views to be in sync...."92 However, it would take almost two years
before any agreement would be nalized.
The rst announcement of a rm agreement came on May 8, 1997.93 Although technically referred to as \an
agreement in principle", the announcement included a very detailed explanation of where the line would be
drawn. The agreement as announced called for antimicrobials used in food packaging to remain at FDA and
be regulated as food additives under Section 409 of the FD & C Act. In turn, antimicrobials used in or on
articles other than food packaging will be dealt with as follows:

EPA will have jurisdiction under Section 408 for hard surface sanitizers;

If the substance is intended for incorporation into nished articles/surfaces that will contact food, FDA will have jurisdiction if the antimicrobial in the article is intended to have no antimicrobial eect, or is intended to have an antimicrobial eect on a processed food. However, if the antimicrobial in such an article is intended to have an antimicrobial eect (e.g.,inhibiting microbial growth on cutting boards or conveyor belts), then it will be regulated by the EPA.

EPA will also have jurisdiction if the antimicrobial in such an article (e.g., a cutting board) is intended to have an antimicrobial eect on a raw agricultural commodity.

91See FQPA Jurisdiction Issues Being Sorted Out by FDA and EPA, Food Chemical News, Vol. 38, No. 44 (Dec. 23, 1996).
92Id.
93See EPA, FDA Reach Tentative Decision on FQPA Jurisdiction Issue, Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News, Vol. 25, No. 29
(May 14, 1997).
23No decision with respect to jurisdiction for process water sanitizers was reached.94
This agreement was slated to be solidied via a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Agencies.
However, such an MOU would never be drafted.
Apparently, the problem with the May 8th agreement was that it was still based on making a distinction
between processed foods and raw agricultural commodities. Unable to work out the logistics of drawing such
a line, the agencies went back to the proverbial drawing board. A few months later they announced that a
new approach to the jurisdictional problem would be tried.95 At a Sept. 17 meeting, the two agencies agreed
that it was fruitless to try to dene jurisdiction in terms of whether food was processed or not. Instead,
the agencies agreed that an amicable result could be achieved by redening the term pest under FIFRA.96
The intended eect of altering the denition of \pest" would be to restrict the term such that more uses of
antimicrobial substances will be deemed food additives instead of pesticides.97 This would return jurisdiction
to the FDA for those types of antimicrobials that were accidentally transferred to EPA's jurisdiction.
A month after their decision to redene \pest" through regulatory avenues, the agencies decided to employ
a two-pronged attack by pursuing both a regulatory and legislative approach.98 Presumably, the primary
advantage of a legislative x is timing. A regulatory approach would tend to take longer, given the notice
and comment requirements. Curiously, however, while the proposed rule focused on amending the term
\pest", the legislative solution was aimed at the term \pesticide chemical". Although the intended eect
was to be the same in either case, the result may turn out to be dierent.99
95See EPA and FDA nd creative solution to FQPA jurisdiction question, Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News, Vol. 25, No.
50 (Oct. 8, 1997).
96See id. (stating that George Pauli, director of the Division of Product Policy in FDA's Oce of Premarket Approval stated
publicly that the agencies do in fact have an agreement to implement the new approach).
97See id.
98See Legislative solution to FQPA jurisdiction questions pursued, Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Nov.
5, 1997).
99See infra discussion Section IV.D through IV.E.
24On October 9, after two years of agency eorts, Congress passed the Antimicrobial Regulation Technical
Corrections Act of 1998 (ARTCA).100 ARTCA amends the denition of \pesticide chemical" such that reg-
ulatory jurisdiction reverts back to FDA in the following situations:

In food processing facilities, pesticide residues used on unprocessed foods or the water used on such foods are subject to FDA's food additives rules under section 409 of FD & C Act. This applies only to food processing facilities, however, which include all facilities other than those that only wash, wax, fumigate, and pack.

Pesticide residues used in or on food packaging materials also revert back to FDA jurisdiction under the food additive rules of section 409 of FD & C Act.

Jurisdiction over antimicrobials used on food contact surfaces (e.g. cutting boards, conveyor belts, etc.) and antimicrobials used in food contact surface (other than packaging) where the antimicrobial is intended to have an ongoing eect on the food contact surface were transferred to the EPA under the FQPA. ARTCA redenes the term \pesticide chemical" such that these antimicrobials will remain under EPA jurisdiction.101
Ironically, on the same day that ARTCA passed, the EPA and FDA jointly issued a notice of policy in-
terpretation, announcing their nal proposal for solution to the jurisdictional debate.102 With one notable
exception, passage of the Act makes the proposed rules largely unnecessary.
100The Antimicrobial Regulation Technical Corrections Act (ARTCA) of 1998 (P.L. 105-324, 112 Stat. 3035).
102See generally 63 Fed. Reg. 54532 (Oct. 9, 1998).
25D. The Persistent Dual Standard
The one notable exception mentioned above involves the complication posed by food processing facilities. In
particular, after ARTCA, antimicrobials on raw agricultural commodities in food processing facilities and in
or on food contact materials are still considered \pesticides", subject to FIFRA registration requirements
under section 408. However, under the new denition of \pesticide chemical", such residues may no longer
be covered.103 Given the broad denition of \food additive", such residues would then be classied as such
under section 409 of the FD&C Act, subject to FDA jurisdiction. The end result is that there are still
situations, although denitely fewer than before FQPA, where a pesticide is judged under two separate
standards. For example, it is possible for a pesticide to not be registrable because it fails the new section
408 safety standard, yet have foods treated with it considered unadulterated as long as such residues pass
any food additive standards.104
The FQPA did in fact create a brighter line by relegating all section 408 duties to the EPA and all section
409 duties to the FDA.105 Post-ARTCA, however, the jurisdictional crossover is not dual-agency jurisdiction
as it was previously, but rather it is dual-chemical jurisdiction, with the double standard coming by way of
the dierences between section 408 and section 409.106
E. The Final Fix?
103See ARTCA Becomes Law, supra note 75.
104See id.
105\EPA issued food additive regulations for residues of pesticide chemicals that were expected to concentrate beyond the
tolerance for the raw agricultural commodity when foods were processed." Jurisdiction Over Antimicrobials, supra note 86.
106See Appendix A (outlining the dierences between section 408 and section 409).
26Recognizing the persistent dual jurisdictional problem, the EPA and FDA proposed a solution in the same
October 9, 1998 notice discussed above. The solution comes by way of redening the term \pest", as they had
previously proposed to do. The new denition would exclude \microbes that are in or on raw agricultural
commodities or in process water used on such commodities in a food processing facility."107 Thus, this
troublesome category of pesticides would not fall under the FIFRA section 408 denition, nor the FD&C
Act \pesticide chemical" denition, but would instead be regulated as soley a \food additive" under section
409.
That is not the end of the story, however. This proposal is not unanimously acceptable due to the fact that it
removes requirements that some antimicrobial manufacturers register their products with the EPA. Industry
claims that this would be unfair to those companies who have already had to register their products.108
According to Paul Wright, attorney for Dow Chemical Co., the proposal would create marketplace confusion
since some companies will have to maintain two sets of labels for the same product, depending on the intended
use.109 Further, The Biocides Panel, part of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, plans to oppose the
rule.110 Thus, it does not appear that we've heard the last on this issue.
10763 Fed. Reg. 54532, at 54537.
108See Bert McMeen, Pesticides: Anti-microbial Bill Passed in House Would Restore Some FDA Jurisdiction, BNA Chemical
Regulation Daily News (Oct. 13, 1998).
109See id. (noting that, up to this point, chemicals registered under FIFRA cannot be used for non-FIFRA application under
the law, and that changing this premise would create the need to have a two-label system, one for FIFRA application and one
for non-FIFRA uses).
110See id.
27V. Conclusion
Despite consistent criticism from both industry and environmental groups, the FDA and EPA have managed
to clear two large hurdles. First, and most formidable, was the \Delaney Paradox". Second, the jurisdictional
surprise that followed from the Delaney x. Much has been said about the inability of the system to correct
that which is obviously in need of repair, but if one keeps in mind how many hands are on the controls, it is
almost remarkable that this was ever accomplished. With the load voices of industry and environmentalists,
Congress is sure to hear two very dierent sides on this inherently ambiguous issue, and anything less than a
perfect scientic answer is sure to seed the process with the personal biases and convictions of the decision-
makers. In addition, although allowed wide discretion, agencies often stand helpless to correct a legislative
mistake. As was seen with the Delaney Clause, an attempt to undo some of the unintended side eects of
a legislative mandate can be met with a court order, courtesy of one side of a cause or the other. To make
matters worse, these issues often have more than two sides, with the majority of the debate taking place
somewhere in between.
Although the twisted road that has been pesticide regulation appears to be straightening out, one wonders if
a \nal x" will ever be possible, given the constant creation of new types of pesticides and new applications
for them.
28APPENDIX A: Comparison of Sections 409 and 408
SECTION 408 SECTION 409
Safety standard specically pro-
hibits approval of substances that
cause cancer by ingestion (De-
laney Clause); otherwise, discre-
tion is left to the agency to de-
termine safety. Constituents pol-
icy allows substances to be ap-
proved that have carcinogenic im-
purities as long as the food addi-
tive, per se, is not carcinogenic.
Safety standard specically man-
dates consideration of several fac-
tors, e.g., cumulative exposure from
the same and related substances,
special safety factors to account
for increased risks to children, and
consideration of endocrine eects.
No statutory reeval-
uation is mandated.
Within ten years all existing tol-
erances must be reevaluated under
the new safety criteria noted above
Safety data become public. Safety and ecacy data become pub-
lic but with limitations intended to
prevent use of the data for foreign ap-
provals and data compensation ap-
plies to subsequent applicants that
have not generated their own data.
De minimis levels (assuming they are
not already exempt by virtue of gen-
eral recognition of safety) may be
exempted from regulation; a cod-
ied threshold of regulation pol-
icy applies to applications that re-
sult in dietary exposures of less
than 0.5 ppb in the daily diet.
Exemptions from tolerance may
be issued where residues are safe
at all expected levels or are ex-
pected to be trivial. This is
not an exemption from the need
for a regulation, just an exemp-
tion from the need for a specic
quantity limitation on specic foods.
Regulations applicable to antimi-
crobials generally dene condi-
tions for use that will not create
unsafe residues based upon con-
servative assumptions dened in
the petition seeking approval.
Traditionally, tolerances have fo-
cused on the need to quantify
residues and develop validated an-
alytical methods to detect the
residues. Enforcement of toler-
ances is independent of whether
the pesticide was properly used
in accordance with its directions.
29Food cannot be adulterated
as a result of use of an ad-
ditive in accordance with
a food additive regulation.
Food is automatically adulter-
ated, notwithstanding use of a
pesticide in accordance with its
labeling, unless an applicable
tolerance or exemption from tol-
erance has been promulgated.
Reprinted from John Dubeck, \Jurisdiction Over Antimicrobials", supra note 86.
30